Will Ranjan-Churchill

Media bias, VPNs, and what the Government thinks about your cyber security

There's a bit of chatter in some circles about encryption and why it makes it easier to do crime. I think it's a price we need to pay.

So, a nice and light topic then...

I was listening to the BBC's Sliced Bread podcast on the weekend. Specifically, this episode about VPNs. Broadly speaking, it's a good episode, with some good content. If you haven't listened to Sliced Bread before (and I hadn't), the format is they take a listener question about a current fad, and ask experts on that thing to weigh in on whether it's the best thing since... well, since sliced bread.

If you're in the market for a 30 minute overview on what a VPN is, isn't, and whether you should get one, you could definitely do worse.

There was one glaring thing that stuck out to me though. Something that highlighted for me once again that you really have to understand where you get your information from - even if (especially if) it's from an institution like the BBC.

Governments and encryption

You can't talk about VPNs in the current climate without talking about government's opinions of both them, and the wider discussion around encryption of data. And Sliced Bread was no exception to this.

But here we come to my problem.

This episode's expert was Professor Victoria Banes from the Chartered Institute for IT. In this section around how governments are handling VPNs, she presented the position that encryption is contentious. The one-sided view she gave was that because encryption allows bad actors to communicate without fear of being caught, encryption poses a big problem to the intelligence community, and by extension the safety of citizens.

The thing is, no one in technology thinks encryption is a bad thing. Including, by the way, Professor Banes from 10 minutes earlier in the episode.

But the second a whiff of politics hits the airwaves, the BBC has to ensure that they muddy the waters enough to give them coverage if and when the government succeeds in criminalising the obscuring of your identity online.

Wait, what's the argument here?

Many messaging platforms, including the likes of WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram, make use of something called end-to-end encryption. This means that your message is encrypted on your phone, sent through all the various channels it needs to go through to get to the other end, and is only decrypted on the recipient's phone. In other words, anyone who intercepts that message will not be able to read it.

The argument goes that this technology makes it easier for criminals ranging from drug dealers to international terrorists to do business without fear of being caught.

That sounds bad. But the solution put forward by governments in many countries - including our own - is to allow a "backdoor" into the system. This would be a way for the government to basically read any messages they wanted to, under the auspices of national security.

Isn't this all a little tin-foil hats?

Palestine Action supporters were arrested for holding up signs condemning genocide. Nearly 3,000 supporters of non-violent protests were arrested. As it turns out, proscribing this particular organisation was illegal (twice), making those arrests also unlawful.

How is that relevant? Well, the government had at its disposal a tool that supposed to be for a very specific and egregious set of circumstances. Proscribing an organisation was designed as a very big stick to deter people from supporting organisations that involve - for example - serious violence against persons (including endangering lives), or that creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public. This big stick should be used proportionately. Yet this government applied that measure to a non-violent, relatively fringe (at the time) organisation, on the grounds that it didn't agree with the messaging.

If a government can do this, what do you think it's going to do with a magic key that lets them read every single message sent across the country? Add to this the increase in requirements for government ID for online services like VPN use, and AI-powered surveillance vans, and soon there will be no privacy from the government of the day.

If you give this kind of power to a government, it will abuse it. Maybe not immediately, and maybe not to you. But it will happen.

What can you do?

Stay informed. Keep an eye out on the news for stories like last year's UK vs Apple showdown, and pay attention to where that news is coming from.

If you want a little more involvement, organisations like the Open Rights Group do a lot of work around this, including open letters, awareness campaigns, and jargon-free explanations of some core concepts.

And sure, get a VPN if you think it would be useful to you. I've got one. Want to chat about whether you should too? Get in touch.

cyber security, politics, online safety act


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